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SUBJECT MATTER IN JOHN DEWEY: MAKING OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE
J. J. CHAMBLISS
In a syllabus for "Introduction to Philosophy," a course taught at the University at the University
of Michigan in 1892, John Dewey worked on a problematic that was to continue to engage him right down
to his collaborative work with Arthur F. Bentley, which culminated in the essays published as Knowing and
the Known in 1949. 1 Beginning with a "General Statement of Nature of Experience" in the 1892
syllabus, Dewey pointed out that "our experience is simply what we do." 2 In the doing of an infant, "there
is simply the experiencing." Here, Dewey continues, "there is no distinction of a me and not-me... This
practice constitutes at first both self and world of reality. There is no distinction."3 In going on to ask how
the original experience gets to be broken into two parts - "How does the distinction arise between things
which aifl. experienced and a subject which has. these experiences; between an external and an
internal?"--4 Dewey was embarking on a journey of investigation that never arrived at its destination, for
exactly what constitutes the "practice," or the "experiencing" itself, came to be continually reworked so
that, near the end of his life, Dewey was prepared to substitute "culture" for "experience" in a projected
revision of Experience and Nature. As we shall see, Dewey's journey of investigation was not satisfied
with asking how the original experience "gets to be broken," but also tried to determine how we could put
it back together.
The aim of this essay is to characterize Dewey's attempts to put "broken" experience back
together as an inquiry into the nature of subject matter. 5 Exploring the nature of subject matter involved
the nature of "objects" of inquiry (the relationship between subject and object, along with their corollaries,
subjectivity and objectivity), came to be familiar themes in Dewey's writings. In an unpublished typescript,
written about 1909, Dewey points to three meaning of the term "object": "In the first sense, it denotes
existence irrespective of value or validity; in the second, it denotes daia. crude material, as selective
determinations of existence for the sake of their interpretation or valuation in reference to meaning; in the
third, it denotes valid object, l a d which is secure, which satisfies the conditions of knowledge." 6 In his
discussions of these different senses in philosophical and educational writings, Dewey was sensitive to
these distinctions, and was especially careful to emphasize the distinction between "objects" as existents
or as data, from objects that are made in the process of testing ideas in inquiry.
The present essay is divided into three parts. We shall begin with Dewey's comparison of the
"objective" character of ancient Greek philosophy with the "subjective" character of modem philosophy.
Next, the way in which subject matter may be called "objects of knowing" will be considered. And, finally
we shall take into account the way in which Dewey attempted to clarify the nature of subject matter as he
and Arthur F. Bentley developed a "transactional" approach to problems of knowing and the known.
Here we are interested in thinking about subject matter in two ways: first, in a general sense, in
which subject matter is involved in attempts to understand the breaking apart and the reconstituting of
"subjects" and "objects," of "knowers" and "knowns." While such attempts are "epistemological," it must
be recognized that they may also be thought of as "psychological," "social," "ethical," and "educational"
pursuits. This leads us to a second way of thinking about subject matter. It is the one we have in mind
when we think of students working with subject matter as they try to understand something - as
examples, we commonly refer to "subjects" or "studies" such as geometry, history, or moral philosophy.
The aim here is not to attempt to show that the way in which students come to know something may be
reduced to epistemological terms. Rather, it is to explore the senses in which Dewey's investigation of the
nature of subject matter addresses a problematic that is common to students of epistemology and to
students of various school subjects.
Anrient

-Qfrjftrtivism"

and Modern "Subjectivism"

In lectures for a course, "Philosophy and Education in Ttieir Historic Relations," which Dewey taught
at Columbia University in 1910-1911, he said that Greek philosophy
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starts with a fact - instead of with the individual. The world -- nature -- cosmos is there and
[the] individual exists by sharing with it; he is of common stuff with nature and all his
processes [are] thereby derived. His mind itself must therefore be an expression of this
objective, ontological world. 7
Dewey called this conception of mind a "dependent expression of nature." It is an "objectivism" rather
than a "subjectivism" in that what is in mind is first, nature's, and then, the individual's, insofar as mind gives
expression to that which is in the nature of things. Mind attempts to tiod what is objectively there, and is
dependent on the nature of what is there. Dewey calls the Aristotelian world a '"qualitative" world, in which
space, form and order belong to objects, work up through the body and come to full
realization... The table is a table, generically. When it expresses itself through this process,
[we] have a conception... Law exists in nature. When that phenomenon of the object
comes to consciousness, you have got a syllogism.8
Finding what is there, becoming aware of syllogisms that show us what is in nature, are qualitative doings;
they are ways of Knowing in a world in which the knower is a part of what is known in such a way that
knowing is an expression of a continuity with nature. Here the world to be known does not exist apart from
the knower but is at home with the knower at the moment of knowing.
The sense in which knower and known are part of a reality that is shared at the moment of knowing is
characterized in a suggestive way in Aristotle's De Anima. where he says that like is affected by like in
perceiving and knowing. He says that there is a sense in which "what acts and what is acted upon are
alike, in another unlike." 9 By this he means that, before the knower knows, the soul is potentially
identical with its object; after the knower knows, the soul is actually identified with its object. In writing
about the "thinking part" of the soul, Aristotle says:
The thinking part of the soul must therefore be, while impassible, capable of receiving the
form of an object; that is, must be potentially identical in character with its object without
being the object. Mind must be related to what is thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible.
1o
Whether mind can actually receive the form of a particular reality can only be settled empirically. Mind does
not make objects of inquiry, but it finds the parts of reality that actually are identical with mind. Because that
part of nature that knows nature is mind, we may say that mind is at home, not "in" nature as a separate
reality, but in a nature of which mind is a natural part. For Aristotle, knowing is something done by nature by
way of mind.
In a letter to Bentley, written in 1944, Dewey showed his familiarity with Aristotle's thinking in De
Anima:
I do not think there was any separation of subject-object, reality-knowing mind, in Greek
philosophy. Knowing was something [that] nature - the cosmos - does. 'Mind, reason' was
not an agent, but the highest order of Being itself. It operated through certain organisms,
parts of the cosmos, by strict natural means, to reproduce itself. 11
And in notes for a 1911 course, "The Analysis of Experience," Dewey wrote: "the world-in-the-mind [is] as
natural as the mind in the world; [it] might perhaps be called nature's second nature; its own offspring;
mind does not conceive, but nature and its conception is mind." 12 This is a way of characterizing the
relation between mind and world which puts us in mind of Aristotle's objectivism. "Nature" and mind
belong to one another: not only does each exist in terms of the other, but there is a sense in which we
may say that nature is "in" mind and mind is "in" nature.
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The modem problem In knowledge, Dewey thought, came about as knowing became an art, a
deliberate technology in which reality was "set over against knowing and the known": this is a restatement
of the breaking apart of original experience into an external and an internal in the 1892 Syllabus. In the
just-mentioned letter to Bentley, Dewey went on to say:
When knowing became an art, it became an occupation carried on by man, not something
done by nature through man. And it was a struggle with and against that which resisted the
art. (Old Professor Gildersleeve once said in an article that an 'object' is that which objects.)
'Subject' used to stand for subject-matter - what modem philosophy has called objects and 'object,' then," was a name for iL - the cosmic subjectmatter - when attention is
directed to it. 1 3
The Greek way of knowing objects - the subject matters of ordinary experience - was a direct way
of having experience, enjoying or suffering in a qualitative world. In asking, what did the experimental
method to modem physical science do to qualitative subjects, Dewey replied that "it substitutes data for
objects' By this Dewey means:
By data is signified subject-matter for further interpretation; something to be thought about.
Objects are finalities, they are complete, finished; they call for thought only in the way of
definition, classification, logical arrangement, subsumption in syllogisms, etc. But data
signify 'material to serve'; they are indications, evidence, signs, clues to and of something
still to be reached; they are intermediate, not ultimate; means, not finalities." 1 4
While differing from the Greek epistemology, which discovered objects as "finalities" in a qualitative world,
Dewey learned from the Greeks the necessity of beginning our investigations in a qualitative world. It is in
our qualitative world that we find problems to be settled; that world is the world in which "our experience is
simply what we do," as he wrote in the 1892 syllabus. Yet the qualitative world is not the world that is
known as an object of experimental inquiry .
For scientific inquiry always starts from things of the environment experienced in our
everyday life, with things we see, handle, use , enjoy, and suffer from. This is the ordinary
qualitative world. But instead of accepting the qualities and objects of knowledge, subject
to their being given a certain logical arrangement, experimental inquiry treats them as
offering a challenge to thought. They are the materials of problems not of solutions. They
are tq bfl known, rather than objects of knowledge. 1 5
Dewey's kinship with the Greek portrayal of the natural joint activity of knower and known may be
seen when he writes, "If we see that knowing is not the act of an outside spectator but of a participator
inside the natural and social scene, then the true object of knowledge resides in the consequences of
direct action." 1 6 Vet the consequences of direct action," as objects of knowledge, become data for
further action, rather than the actualization of the knower's potentiality. The objects gained by knowing
may settle proximate questions, but they do not settle questions about the nature of things in a way that
describes their qualities once and for all. In a discussion with Elsie Ripley Clapp, Dewey once
characterized the object of knowing as "a made object, not a found object." 1 7 Objects are made, not
found, in that investigators have a place in making the situations in which investigation goes on; different
situations call for different makings that bring about different objects as consequences. The nature of
what we call the "findings" of our investigations is dependent on the process of finding, and what is
"found" thus takes its shape. In this kind of activity, participants do not merely look and "find what is
there," but take what is there and strive to make something take place. Or, what is taken is not for its own
sake, for the sake of trying to make something that takes its place in the nature of things. To say that
objects are made is to hold that the nature of things is different as a consequence of the making.
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Subject Matter and Objects of Knowing
The process of making objects in experimental inquiry has a counterpart in students making subject
matter when they learn. In discussing the possibility of "carrying into the region of values" the principle of
scientific practice, Dewey holds that "it would surely effect a transfer of attention and energy from the
subjective to the objective." 16 Students of the subject matters that make up their studies could think of
themselves as agents in their own doing and making, rather than merely as consumers of that which has
already been done and made by others. When Dewey writes, "the relegation of the problematic to the
'subjective' is a product of the habit of isolating man and experience from nature," 1 9 he is asserting his
kinship with the Greek idea that human beings must think of themselves as being at home in nature rather
than "subjective" beings whose minds are isolated from nature. At the same time, he is claiming that we
need to free ourselves from the Greek idea that we are capable only of finding what is there in nature, and
come to recognize that we can be at home when the nature we know is the nature we make.
In 1896 lectures on the philosophy of education, Dewey puts us in mind of his later distinction in
Quest for Certainty between "things of the environment" and "the materials of problems" in saying:
Every genuine experience involves not simply an object, but also doing something with that
object; using it in a certain way: If we do not actually handle the thing we at least see it or
touch it or think about it, and this seeing, touching, or thinking is an act which cannot be
shut out from experience. 2 0
This is a claim that one having an experience participates with the "objects" involved in the activity; as a
participant one is making the experience rather than being a spectator of an external world. In this
instance, Dewey is using "object" in its second sense as set out in his unpublished 1909 paper: "data,
crude material, as selective determinations of existence for the sake of their interpretation or valuation in
reference to meaning." In the 1896 lectures, Dewey goes on to say:
There is ... the objective side - which very often is considered to be the reality and thus the
entire experience. There is the thing seen; the noise heard or whatever, the experience
involves the recognition or identification of a certain quality. The whole experience may
then be described as an activity which is occupied with a certain quality or object and which
is felt to possess a certain value according to the particular position which it occupies in the
whole system of life. 2 1
Thus understood, the distinction made in the 1892 Syllabus between a subject that has an experience
and things that are experienced is less important than "an activity which is occupied with a certain quality";
and the "certain value" which the activity takes on becomes the object possessed and, at the same time, is
the subject matter known. As in the ancient Greeks, the "object" is possessed by the knower, and simply
and directly the subject matter is known. Yet Dewey differs from the ancient Greeks in holding that subject
matter is made, not found.
»" I h f l Chi'd and the Curriculum, published in 1902, Dewey characterized "the child's experienceas "continuous reconstruction":
Abandon the notion of subject-matter as something fixed and readymade in itself, outside
the child's experience; cease thinking of the child's experience as also something hard and
fast; see it as something; fluent, embryonic, vital; and we realize that the child and the
curriculum are simply two limits which define a single process. Just as two points define a
straight line, so the present standpoint of the child and the facts and truths of studies
define instruction. It is continuous reconstruction, moving from the child' s present
experience out into that represented by the organized bodies of truth that we call studies.
22
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The pathway of "continuous reconstruction" is one in which the child makes subject-matter according to
the terms of its moving from one form of experience - which already is the child's subject-matter -- toward
another subject-matter - that which makes up school studies. Thus children already have subject-matter
when they come to school; it is with this subject-matter, existing in the lives of children, that teachers must
begin. We might put it in the following way: As there is no child who does not already possess a subjectmatter, there is no subject-matter which has not been possessed by a child, for the subject matter of
school studies itself was made by those investigators who were "children" of various subject-matters in the
making. As Dewey puts it, "the facts and truths that enter into the child's present experience, and those
contained in the subject-matter of studies, are the initial and final terms of one reality. To oppose one to
the other is to oppose the infancy and maturity of the same growing life." 2 3 The "facts and truths" with
which the child begins, and those which the child later takes on, are both subject-matter for the child, each
at different phases of its development; yet each is qualitatively different from the other. The reference to
infancy and maturity points, not only to "growing child," but equally to "subject-matter in the making."
Making subject-matters is another way of talking about children growing.
In his educational writings, Dewey discusses the intimate relationship of doing with what is done, or
doing with the way it is done, in referring to children's experience. In referring to the child's "image" of
something, Dewey says, "Every image has its motor fringe, its tendency to produce change. Early in life
this tendency is realized at once; when a child thinks of anything he tends to do it." 2 4 The beginning of
thinking is seen in the child's actions by which it strives to move from an image of something to do to doing
it, or to making something that the image "drives" the child to make. This is the child's way of making
subject matter by doing what the image calls for. In this way, imaging is the origin of thinking, itself a kind of
doing: "Every image tends, sooner or later, to reflect itself in actual doing, because it itself is a partial
forming, or forming coordination." 25 It is not a mere play on words to say that a "forming coordination" is
a way of making one do what the image suggests. "An image," Dewey continues, "is in reality an activity; it
is a certain operation or doing." 26
When we emphasize the quality of the experience undergone rather than the thing experienced in
relation to the subject experiencing it, we share something of Aristotle's objectivism without being
restricted by its limitations. Put differently, Dewey thinks that we accept the "qualitative world" of shared
doers and things done, of knowers and knowns, and at the same time participate in making that world and
not merely "find" the world that is there. In the following passage, Dewey thinks of two "sides" of
experience - one. the "objective," which may be shared with others - and the other- a "subjective" side:
More technically still it may be said that this side of experience is the objective. It is the
general side. It stands for that part of the experience which may be shared with others;
which others may test; while the feeling aspect is a subjective and personal side, having to
do with the worth which the activity has for the particular agent who performs it. 2 7
The "objective" of the experience is to make an "object." This is a counterpart of Aristotle's
objectivism, according to which the mind is an expression of the objective world that is there. Others also
may know, when their minds give expression to the same world. Or, we may test others' findings by
searching for them, not for ourselves in a "subjective" way, but for the meaning of the objective world that
is there. Dewey wants to acknowledge a sense in which we may speak of a subjective dimension of
experience, but makes it clear that the worth of the experience for the agent must be distinguished from
the objective side which has a shared meaning.
In discussing the "subject matter of instruction," Dewey says that it is like any fact or truth. "It
becomes an object of study - that is, of inquiry and reflection - when it figures as a factor to be reckoned
with in the completion of a course of events in which one is engaged and by whose outcome one is
affected." 2 8 When the matter to which one subjects oneself becomes the objects of study, we may say
that the objects are made. When Dewey goes on to say, "Numbers iare not objects of study just because
they are numbers already constituting a branch of learning called mathematics, but because they
represent qualities and relations of the world in which our action goes on, because they are factors upon
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which the accomplishment of our purposes depends," 2 9 he points to the sense in which the activity of
the agent with purposes in mind is a requisite for making the objects dq something. The doing is with
something for a purpose, and what the doing is "with" constitutes the subject matter. Making subject
matters do certain things is to make them objects of study; thus in the process of inquiry, making subject
matters, and making them objects, are indistinguishable in the course of events. When the subject matter
possessed by the agent becomes the object, the subject matter is known. The necessary kinship of
knower and known is apparent in this sentence: "Interest means that one is identified with the objects
which define the activity and which furnish the means and obstacles to its realization." 3 0 "Identified" is a
strong verb here, putting us in mind of the "thinking part" of Aristotle's soul, when it is identified with its
object in knowing. We may also think of the child who does the bidding of the image in its mind.
So far we have attempted to characterize the sense in which (I) subject matter and objects or
knowing are defined in terms of each other; (2) this shows the influence of the Aristotelian world in which
knower and known share a common world; (3) yet Dewey tried to escape Aristotle's "naivete" in thinking
that what is known is what is discovered by holding that the knower makes what is known; (4) the corollary
of this in school situations lies in the idea that the child does not merely take subject matter as given by
the teacher or the syllabus, but must make subject matter by becoming an agent in determining objects of
study. In this characterization, we have tried to show that there is common ground on which stand both the
experimental method of inquiry which makes objects of knowledge, and the student who makes subjectmatter.
Next we shall turn to another way in which Dewey argues that objects of knowledge must be
considered in the context of knowledge-getting. In the Introduction to Essavs in Experimental Logic, he
writes:
It may well be admitted that there is a real sense in which knowledge . . . does not come
into existence till thinking has terminated in the experimental act which fulfills the
specifications set forth in thinking. But what is also true is that the object thus determined
is an object of knowledge only because of the thinking which has preceded it and to
which it sets a happy turn. 3 1
Note that the object is determined, not simply found. This is to say that one finds, or comes up against, all
sorts of things in ordinary experience - sticks and stones, arguments and counter-arguments - but these
are not objects of knowledge until they are determined in an activity which has a purpose. This is so, even
though the things may have been objects determined as a consequence of others' having taken action
with a purpose. We may say the same of a student in relation to a teacher's subject matter. What is subject
matter for the teacher is not subject matter for the student until the latter can make it an object by having it
"fulfill the specifications" of his own thinking. The activity by which one "gets" knowledge, or makes
subject matter, is the way "to know what is known," Dewey claims in this sentence: "There is no way to
know what are the traits of known objects, as distinct from imaginary objects, or objects of opinion, or
objects of unanalytic commonsense, save by referring to the operations of getting, using, and testing
evidence - the processes of knowledge getting" 3 2 The idea that objects of knowledge are ends of our
inquiries and that they are practical is emphasized in the following passage, in which Dewey discusses
"the practice of science" as "a logic of experimental discovery":
It makes necessary the conception that the object of knowledge is not something with
which thinking sets out, but something with which it ends: something which the
processes of inquiry and testing, that constitute thinking, themselves produce. Thus the
object of knowledge is practical in the sense that it depends upon a specific kind of
practice for its existence -- for its existence as an object of knowledge. 3 3
Again, Dewey does not separate knowing from the knower, in that the object of knowledge is subject to
the processes set in motion by the knower, and the meaning of those processes is found out in the
consequences of engaging in the process. In the passage just quoted Dewey refers to the object or
knowledge as being practical in that a specific kind of practice brought it into being. In an essay on William
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James' Pragmatism, entitled "What Pragmatism Means by Practical," Dewey points to a sense in which an
idea is practical. Here Dewey again shows the sense in which objects of knowledge are made in actions
which test the meaning of ideas. "For what an idea as idea means, is precisely that an object is ooi
given." 3 4 Whatever is '"given," an idea must be "taken" by acting in a certain way to find out the
consequences of the acting.
When , then, it is a question of an idea, it is the idea itself which is practical (being an
intent) and its meaning resides in the existences which, as changed, it intends. While the
meaning of an object is the change it requires in our attitude, the meaning of an idea is the
change it, as our attitude, effects in objects. 35
Knowers make the object which they come to know; they are agents of making and doing. In making and
doing, the objects constituted are what is done and made; they did not exist prior to the doing and
making. Thus inquiry by which we strive to know something has both a "subjective" and an "objective"
character; what we enable ourselves to be subjected to is in process of being made and done even while
we are making and doing in an attempt to bring objects into existence.
Subject Matter and Objects of Knowledge in Transaction.
We have already pointed out that Dewey did not find any separation of subject from object, of
mind that knows from reality known, in Greek philosophy. And Dewey added that what modern
philosophy has called objects were subject matter to the Greeks. We have shown, further, that Dewey
attempted to join knower and known, subject matter and object, in various epistemological writings as well
as in educational writings dealing with students making subject matters as objects of study. In five letters to
Bentley, Dewey discusses this problematic, in one saying, T h e Greek used 'subject' where modern
philosophers have said 'object.' I think perhaps that influenced my use of 'subject-matter* - a subject in
the sense that what you talk or write about - running off on the symbolic side into topic, theme." 3 6
Dewey's preference for "objects" in referring to outcomes of inquiry, and his insistence that
"subjectmatter" be used in ways that indicate his kinship with the Greek sense of it as knower participating
in, or joining with, the matter in direct experience, needed to be clearly stated, Bentley thought. So he
wrote to Dewey, "Whenever a reference to . Subject comes up, you indicate that you have no need for
and no use for it... However, whenever reference to the Qbied is necessary, you indicate that the object
is needed, and you are not trying to get away from it." 3 7 The kind of subject for which Dewey has no
use is the subject of modem philosophy that stands apart from the "objective world" it wants to know.
Recognizing that Dewey holds that "subject" and "object" in that sense do not exist, but are distinctions
made possible only when knower and known share a common ground, Bentley continues,
I now suggest... When you say you do not need the subject, say also that you do not
need the kind of a object that goes with the kind of a subject you do not need. When you
say that you need the object, say also that you need the kind of a subject that goes with
that kind of an object. 3 8
In response to Bentley, Dewey wrote:
(I) I doubtless have used the word 'object' in a pre-organism sense, and (2) even when I
don't, there are a lot of persons who probably assume I'm using it in that sense. [Basil L.]
Gildersleeve once wrote that 'objects' is something which 'objects' - what it objects to,
being the execution of some plan or aim or desire of ours. 'Object' is also what is aimed a t
I think these two meanings cover the ground pretty well 3 9
To use the word in a "pre-organism sense" is to use it as if objects existed prior to organisms which are
able to perceive them, in the popular sense as "things" which exist out there in the environment. This
sense is consistent with the first sense of "object" in his 1909 unpublished paper: "it denotes existence
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irrespective of value or validity." Dewey, in his letter to Bentley, is not concerned with denying the
existence of "things" apart from perceiving or knowing them; but he is concerned with understanding
their status a s objects known, and equally, with understanding that the matter to which human beings
subject themselves in active processes of testing ideas actually becomes objects of knowledge.
In 1942, Dewey and Bentley were hard at work establishing a terminology that would accurately
express their approach to the process of knowing and the known. Bentley said that he was attracted to
Dewey's word "transaction":
I found a sentence I had written referring to your 'interaction (transaction).1 I also found
myself in revision crossing out the 'interaction' and the parentheses and leaving
transaction' stand. 'Interaction' implies two actors and an 'inter... "Situation,' which I have
used somewhat and you have used in the Logic, has the same effect... Transaction' is
free from this, and even vulgarly detaches the transaction fairly well in naming, from the
transactors" 4 0
For some time, Dewey had used the term "interaction" to indicate that in knowing, the knower interacts
with an environment, actively pursuing the test of an idea; at the same time, certain elements in the
environment interact with the knower. In thinking of this kind of process as an interaction, rather than one
in which a spectator merely "observes" an external reality, Dewey was trying to emphasize the bringing
together of knower and environment with "inter," and the necessity for actively involving knower and
environment with "action." Bentley pressed Dewey:
The only differences between your approach and mine ... is that I have been striving for a
direct naming of the transaction,' while you have been specifying that you deal with
transaction,' but carrying on discussion in terms of coalescing participants. I want to
specify the coalescence first and then get back to the participants.41
What Bentley was seeking was a term which specifies that which takes place when "knowers know,"
"agents act" and students make subject matter as they pursue objects of study: it is the sense in which
participants do not stand as distinct existents until the activity undergone has reached the consequences
of the testing of an idea, or has made objects of knowledge which then and only then constitute the
subjectmatter of the process that was going on. To put it in another way: there is no knower of a
subjectmatter and no subjectmatter until the knower knows the subject matter; then and only then can we
think of a knower as distinct from the subjectmatter it knows.
Dewey responded to Bentley by writing: "I agree with what you say about transaction' and shall
use the word in further writing whenever it is a question of first-hand matters or primary presentation, and
will reserve 'interactivity* for cases in which it has been made clear that, for a special purpose and problem,
one of the partakers in a transaction has been analyzed out." 4 2 In a later letter, Dewey shows his
agreement with Bentley "I want to specify the coalescence first and then get back to the participants" in
writing,
Organism-Environment 'Interaction' is a distinction-connection in knowledge. That is, the
facts to which the names Environment, Organism, and Interaction apply are facts in and of
knowledge. There is no knowledge of organism and environment [as first] separate from
each other, and ltifin interacting; they are known as interacting 4 3
Although Dewey uses the term "interaction" here, it is clear that he thinks of the process as a transaction.
The relation of knower and known comes to exist in and as the knowing; only then can we distinguish
knower from known; before the transaction existed neither as knower nor known. In what Dewey and
Bentley came to call the knowing-known process, the "relation" established (Bentley's "coalescence")
makes that which Is known, and only if a known is established can we say that a knower and a known exist.
Thus the process that makes objects of knowledge makes the knower of them as well.
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Dewey and Bentley were watchful of the tendency to think of knowers and knowns as isolates that
needed to be put together. In referring to the phrase "product of transactions," Bentley wrote: "I think I
would say here that transaction' cannot have a product, but rather is the fact seen as product." 4 4 Dewey
agreed, saying, "Trans' is a proper word for the actual fact-event as primary and total - that is, in its own
occurrence, without respect to analysis. 'Inter* is, in comparison, a name for a secondary fact - event -analysis of a trans-fact into constituent conditions." 4 5 In another letter, Dewey again makes the point
that "theory must be based on what takes place, what is transactional^ done, not upon what is said." 46
This is not to say, however, that "what is said" or what is written cannot be the subjectmatter of
transactions, inasmuch as speaking and writing are activities which make claims of knowledge. In "The
Terminological Problem, a chapter in Knowing and the Known. Dewey and Bentley refer to "observations
of knowledge as a going fact of behavioral activity." They go on:
To see language, with all it speakings and writings, as man-himself-in-action-dealing-withthings is observation of the combining type... The full event is before us thus in durational
spread. The observation is no longer made in terms of 'isolates' requiring to be
'synthesized.'... The extension as observation in our case is that we make it cover the
speaker or knower along with the spoken of or known as being one common durational
event. Here primary speaking is as observational as is a bird in flight... Observations of
this general type sees man-in-action, not as something merely acting 'in' a world, but as
action ol and in the worid in which the man belongs as an integral constituent. 4 7
If we recall Dewey's 1892 Syllabus, in which he wrote that, in the activity of an infant, "there is no
distinction of a me and not-me...This practice constitutes at first both self and world reality. There is no
distinction," 4 8 we can take Dewey and Bentley to.be engaged in a methodology in which adult students
of transactions, of doings, dones, namings-named, knowings-known, are "as little children." "We proceed
upon the postulate," wrote Dewey and Bentley, "that knowings are always and everywhere inseparable
from the knowns - that the two are twin aspects of common fact. 4 9
In considering the nature of subjectmatter In the context of transaction, it is not impertinent to
suggest that Dewey and Bentley are showing us that the actions taken by adult inquirers in determining
the subjectmatter that is settled as objects of knowledge is the epistemological counterpart of the actions
of little children who do things which the images in their minds call for. In "A Trial Group of Names," in
Knowing and the Known. "Subjectmatter is defined as follows: "Whatever is before inquiry where inquiry
has the range of namings-named." 5 0 Dewey and Bentley preferred "namings" and "named" as
suggestive of language behavior as a way of knowing, as the active process of naming things and having
them as named, to the word "concept," which to them was redolent of fixed entities, isolated from knowing
and naming as taking place transactional^. On their definition, whatever is in process of naming-named
may constitute subjectmatter when it comes into being in the activity of investigation, as the definition of
"Object" indicates:
Within fact, and within existential phase, object is that which acquires firmest specification,
and is thus distinguished from situation and event. This holds to the determination of
Dewey (Logic, p. 119: also pp. 129, 520, fiLal) that in inquiry object 'emerges as a
definite constituent of a resolved situation, and is confirmed in the continuity of inquiry'
and is 'subject-matter, so far as it has been produced and ordered in settled form.' 51
Earlier we have seen that Dewey's concern to take "object of knowledge" to be the consequence
of inquiry which is determined by the process in which an idea is tested; we have seen also that the object
as determined is subjectmatter. The activity by which objects of knowledge constitute the test of an idea
is the "durational spread" of transaction in which subjectmatter is made, in Knowing and the Known
Dewey and Bentley make explicit the transactional sense of objects determined and subjectmatters
made. While Dewey's terminology had undergone certain changes by 1949, the problematic addressed how original experience "gets to be broken," and how we can put it back together - was as old as his
Syllabus of 1892.
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